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Abstract The purpose of this article is to highlight problems
with a range of semantic psycholinguistic variables (concrete-
ness, imageability, individual modality norms, and emotional
valence) and to provide a way of avoiding these problems.
Focusing on concreteness, I show that for a large class of
words in the Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman (Behavior
Research Methods 46: 904–911, 2013) concreteness norms,
the mean concreteness values do not reflect the judgments that
actual participants made. This problem applies to nearly every
word in the middle of the concreteness scale. Using list mem-
ory experiments as a case study, I show that many of the
Babstract^ stimuli in concreteness experiments are not un-
equivocally abstract. Instead, they are simply those words
about which participants tend to disagree. I report three repli-
cations of list memory experiments in which the contrast be-
tween concrete and abstract stimuli was maximized, so that
the mean concreteness values were accurate reflections of par-
ticipants’ judgments. The first two experiments did not pro-
duce a concreteness effect. After I introduced an additional
control, the third experiment did produce a concreteness ef-
fect. The article closes with a discussion of the implications of
these results, as well as a consideration of variables other than
concreteness. The sensorimotor experience variables
(imageability and individual modality norms) show the same
distribution as concreteness. The distribution of emotional va-
lence scores is healthier, but variability in ratings takes on a
special significance for this measure because of how the scale
is constructed. I recommend that researchers using these
variables keep the standard deviations of the ratings of their
stimuli as low as possible.
Keywords Concreteness .Semanticvariables .Listmemory .
Methodology
Word concreteness has become one of the most studied vari-
ables in the psycholinguistic literature. Since Paivio, Yuille,
and Madigan (1968) published one of the first large-scale
databases of word concreteness norms, Bconcreteness effects^
have emerged in a variety of investigations of various cogni-
tive processes, and a range of theories have been proposed in
an attempt to explain these effects. Independent teams of re-
searchers operating over a period of decades have repeatedly
shown that concrete words show a processing advantage over
abstract words in certain experimental paradigms. For exam-
ple, concrete words are easier to remember than abstract
words (Allen & Hulme, 2006; Miller & Roodenrys, 2009;
Romani, McAlpine, & Martin, 2008; Walker & Hulme,
1999), are easier to make associations with (de Groot, 1989),
and are more easily and more thoroughly defined in dictionary
definition tasks (Sadoski, Kealy, Goetz, & Paivio, 1997).
Historically, it was claimed that concrete words are responded
to more quickly than abstract words in lexical decision tasks
(Bleasdale, 1987; James, 1975; Kroll & Merves, 1985), al-
though more recent experiments have shown no difference
(Brysbaert, Stevens, Mandera, &Keuleers, 2016), or even that
abstract words might have an advantage after various other
variables have been accounted for (Kousta, Vigliocco,
Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011). However, even an
abstractness advantage in lexical decision points to the utility
of word concreteness as a psycholinguistic variable.
Brain-imaging techniques have also been employed to de-
termine whether the neural systems underpinning concrete
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words and abstract words are distinct (Binder, Westbury,
McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Dhond, Witzel, Dale,
& Halgren, 2007; Kounios & Holcomb, 1994; Pexman,
Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, & Goodyear, 2007; Sabsevitz,
Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005). The general consensus
from these brain-imaging studies is that there is evidence of a
neuroanatomical difference in the processing of concrete ver-
sus abstract words.
Psychologists are clearly heavily invested in the inves-
tigation of word concreteness, and for good reasons. If
there are properties that define a cognitively relevant on-
tology of concepts, concreteness seems like a good can-
didate: Something about what constitutes the concept of
Belephants^ (highly concrete) is probably different from
what constitutes the concept of Bparadoxes^ (highly ab-
stract). However, in this article I will highlight a problem
with the concreteness measure, based on a simple statisti-
cal summary of the Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman
(2013) concreteness norms. I report three replication ex-
periments that together suggest that this problem is not
fatal to concreteness research, but also that it should be
acknowledged when researchers design their stimuli. I al-
so show that the same problem applies to other variables
in semantic databases, such as imageability (Cortese &
Fugett, 2004; Schock, Cortese, & Khanna, 2012) and in-
dividual modality norms (Lynott & Connell, 2012).
Word concreteness
Aword’s concreteness rating is derived by asking a group of
participants to rate that word for concreteness on a Likert
scale. A low score indicates that a word is highly Babstract,^
whereas a high rating indicates that a word is highly
Bconcrete.^ The mean value of all participants’ ratings is
taken to be an approximation of a word’s position on an
abstract-concrete continuum. I will now develop some theo-
retical concerns about the validity of traditional concreteness
norms before turning to a statistical analysis of the Brysbaert
et al. (2013) database. Consider the job a participant is being
asked to do when she is told to rate a word between, say, 1
and 5 on a scale of concreteness. She is told that Bconcrete
words are experienced by the senses,^ whereas abstract
words are not (Paivio et al., 1968). For some words, the
interpretation of traditional concreteness norming instruc-
tions is relatively straightforward. A participant who is pre-
sented with the word Bapple^ is likely to have seen, touched,
smelled, and tasted apples throughout the course of their life,
and will unproblematically assign Bapple^ a high concrete-
ness rating. Similarly, a participant that is presented with the
word Bserendipity^ is likely to reason that since serendipity
is a loose association between some coincidental,
nonspecified events, and is not something that affords direct
sensory experience, the word Bserendipity^ should be
assigned a low concreteness rating. However, what are the
properties that a word/concept should have in order for it to
be assigned a mid-scale rating? It is difficult to formulate a
coherent approach to this task: Can an entity or idea be
Bhalf-seen^ or Bhalf-touched^? What does it mean to have
intermediate sensory experience of an entity or idea? That is
to ask: What is a participant telling us about a word when
they rate it a 3 out of 5? They could mean any one of the
following:
1. Adding up all of my sensory experience of this object
across all five of the sensory modalities, I realize that I
have seen and heard it, but never touched, smelled, or
tasted it. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3.
2. One interpretation of this word brings to mind something
that cannot be directly experienced, whereas a different
interpretation of this word brings to mind something that
can be directly experienced. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3.
3. Sometimes I associate sensory experience with this word,
but sometimes I don’t. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3.
It is certainly possible to imagine more potential ap-
proaches, and there is no empirical basis for selecting
one of these approaches over another. Furthermore, it is
likely that different participants will generate different in-
terpretations for many of the words in any list of words to
be normed. When a participant sees the letter string <
deed > presented in isolation, there is no way that a re-
searcher can control for the fact that half of the partici-
pants may interpret < deed > as referring to a document
associated with proof of property ownership (high con-
creteness value?), and the other half may interpret it as
referring to some unspecified action, perhaps involving
some element of heroism (low concreteness value?).
Consequently, for a number of words it is just not clear
what word/concept the mean concreteness rating is sup-
posed to reflect.
This point on its own might be enough to motivate the
avoidance of words with a mean value in the middle of a
concreteness–abstractness scale. Given that it is not clear
what it is that participants are even telling us when they
rate a word a 3, we might also wonder how often partic-
ipants actually use values from the middle of the concrete-
ness scale when making their judgments. Recently,
Brysbaert et al. (2013) provided a concreteness norm da-
tabase of 40,000 English words, which dwarfs the previ-
ously popular MRC database used in most studies
(Coltheart, 1981). This new, larger database allows a sta-
tistical analysis of the distributions of concreteness norms
across a much larger section of the English lexicon. I now
present this analysis and use it to develop the concerns
raised in this section.
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Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness norms
Brysbaert et al. (2013) collected a new set of concreteness
norms for 40,000 English words. Groups of approximately
25 participants rated subsets of the whole list of 40,000 words
on a concreteness scale of 1 (very abstract) to 5 (very
concrete). The participants (n = 4,237) came from a range of
ages, with approximately one third between 17 and 25 years
old, and two thirds between 26 and 65. The mean value of a
group of participants’ judgments about the concreteness of a
stimulus word was assumed to be a useful approximation of
that word’s position on a hypothesized concrete–abstract con-
tinuum. I shall now argue that this is not necessarily the case.
The standard deviation of a dataset is a measure of the average
distance between all data points in that dataset and the mean
value of all data points in the dataset. If every participant rates
a word as a 1 (highly abstract), then that word’s concreteness
rating will have a standard deviation of 0. However, if half of
the participants rated a word as a 1, but the other half rated the
word as a 5 (highly concrete), that word would have a mean
concreteness rating of 3 but a standard deviation of 2. In Likert
scale norming tasks, the standard deviation of a set of ratings
is therefore a blunt index of the extent to which participants
agreed with each other about how a word should be rated.
If a dataset contains 25 numbers (in our case, 25 individual
concreteness judgments), all of which are integers between 1
and 5, then there are a finite number of possible combinations
of means and standard deviations for that dataset. Figure 1
below plots all of these possible combinations:
Note how, at the extreme ends of the x-axis, only a standard
deviation of 0 is possible, because for a mean value to be 1 or
5, all 25 participants must have rated a word as 1 or 5, respec-
tively. However, in the middle of the scale the disagreement
that is theoretically possible increases, reaching a peak at
mean value ~3, standard deviation ~2. Crucially, it is still
theoretically possible for a data point to occur with a mean
value located in the middle of the scale, but with a relatively
low standard deviation. That is, it is still clearly theoretically
possible for participants to more or less consistently agree that
a word is of intermediate concreteness.
Now, consider Fig. 2, which plots the actual mean con-
creteness value and the standard deviation of every noun in
the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness norm dataset (n =
14,592) over the top of the theoretically possible combina-
tions depicted in Fig. 1.
The pattern is striking. At the extreme concrete end of the
scale, many items have high concreteness ratings and relative-
ly low standard deviations, indicating that participants more or
less agreed in their judgments about how to rate these words.
At the extreme abstract end of the scale, there are likewise
words with low concreteness ratings and relatively low stan-
dard deviations, although not to the same extent as at the
extreme concrete end. However, in the middle of the scale
there is an obvious rise in the standard deviation. Only a hand-
ful of words have a mean value near 3 and a standard deviation
even slightly below 1. Indeed, a large class of words have a
standard deviation well over 1, ranging from mean values of
1.5 to 4.5.
This indicates that for a great number of items, participants
were not agreeing in their judgments of how concrete a stim-
ulus word was. At mean values of 2 and 4 there are many
cases of standard deviations above 1. Remember that ratings
on this scale can only take integer values between 1 and 5.
This means that for many of the words with a mean value of 2
or 4, some participants must have judged these words as be-
longing at the opposite end of the concreteness scale from the
position where the mean value suggests the word belongs.
This phenomenon is problematic for the assumption that con-
creteness should be treated as a continuous variable. This is
because in a vast number of cases, participants’ judgments
tended not to be continuous; instead, they tended to be binary:
Fig. 1 Theoretically possible locations for words rated between 1 and 5
by 25 different participants Fig. 2 Theoretical versus actual locations
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Participants were using values of 1, 2, 4, and 5 in producing
these concreteness norms, and avoided using 3. Furthermore,
in many cases participants were judging a word as a 1 (totally
abstract), whereas others were judging that same word as a 4
(somewhat concrete).
Given these methodological issues, it might seem surpris-
ing that concreteness effects are so widely reported. If mea-
surements for a large section of the hypothesized concreteness
spectrum are actually procedural artifacts, it is then unclear
what phenomenon it is that concreteness effects are actually
indexing. One potential explanation is that generally, when
investigating the effect of a variable, researchers try to choose
stimuli that maximize a change in this variable, in order to
generate the maximum possible effect. It is therefore possible
that empirical concreteness researchmight not suffer too badly
from the problem of binary disagreements concerning
midscale items, because researchers will have aimed to pick
stimuli from the extreme ends of the scale, and these polar
items are less subject to disagreement.
However, if it turns out that many experimental stimuli do
suffer from the disagreement phenomenon, this poses an ex-
planatory problem concerning the evidence in favor of pro-
cessing differences between abstract and concrete items. The
typical finding is that there are processing advantages for con-
crete items relative to abstract items, and the typical explana-
tion of this finding is that concrete and abstract items have
different neurologically instantiated formats and/or structural
relationships. If a significant number of the stimuli included in
an abstract or concrete experimental condition actually come
from the middle of the concreteness scale, then the typical
claim that there are processing differences between concrete
and abstract items is no longer supported by the data. This is
because words from the middle of the scale must have high
standard deviations. This means that only half of the partici-
pants who produced the concreteness measure for that word
judged it to be abstract, and the other half judged it to be
concrete. Therefore, there are no empirical grounds for calling
these words Bconcrete^ or Babstract^ in the first place.
Stimuli in concreteness experiments: A case study
of list memory paradigms
In this section I plot the stimuli featured in four list memory
experimental studies against the entire Brysbaert et al. (2013)
database. These studies are Allen and Hulme (2006), Walker
and Hulme (1999), Romani et al. (2008), and Miller and
Roodenrys (2009). We should note a few things. First, al-
though the replication experiments that I report below feature
noun stimuli, and most studies under discussion here also
featured nouns, occasionally their stimulus sets featured
other word classes alongside nouns. In the case of Allen and
Hulme, many of the stimuli in the abstract condition were not
nominal. Therefore, to display the maximum number of
stimuli for all experiments, I have plotted the entire
Brysbaert et al. (2013) database (n = 40,000) instead of just
the nominal subsection of it. Not all of the stimuli featured in
all experiments appeared in the Brysbaert et al. norms, and
these stimuli have been omitted from the analysis. Second, the
pattern of means and standard deviations is absolutely un-
changed when we compare the entire Brysbaert et al. database
with the noun subsection of it.
Now, consider Fig. 3. The stimuli featured in Romani et al.
(2008) best exemplify the problem, although the intention
here is not to single out Romani et al. or any of the other
authors under discussion for criticism. The analysis I present
here would have been almost impossible to carry out at the
time that these experiments were conducted, given that the
Brysbaert et al. concreteness database was only published in
2013. In brief, the problem is that the concrete words tend to
have low standard deviations, whereas the abstract stimuli
tend to have high standard deviations and to be drawn from
the middle of the scale, rather than the unequivocally abstract
part of the scale. This is potentially problematic for the validity
of Romani et al.’s conclusions regarding concreteness effects,
because many of the stimuli that made up their abstract stimuli
were not unequivocally abstract. For the standard deviations
of many of the Babstract^ stimuli to be as high as they are—in
many cases, well above 1—many participants must have been
judging those words to be concrete during the Brysbaert et al.
(2013) norming process. Some of the abstract stimuli have
standard deviations approaching the theoretical maximum of
2, indicating maximum disagreement among participants
about whether that word is concrete or abstract. To reiterate:
Participants could only apply integer values in making their
judgments. Therefore, even if a word has a mean concreteness
rating of approximately 2, but also a standard deviation of the
rating above 1, that means that some participants must have
been crossing scale halves in making their judgments.
Fig. 3 Romani et al. (2008) stimuli
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Ultimately, it is not clear what comparison is actually being
made here. The concrete stimulus lists were more or less
unproblematically concrete. However, the abstract stimulus
lists contained words drawn from nearly the entire length of
the concreteness scale, and also tended to feature words that
participants disagreed about how to rate.
Figure 4 depicts the abstract and concrete stimuli featured
in Allen and Hulme (2006). Again, many Babstract^ stimuli
here have standard deviations well above 1, indicating that
people disagreed about whether the words were abstract in
the first place. The range of mean ratings of concreteness for
the abstract condition is also clearly much higher than in the
concrete condition. Once again, a relatively homogeneous
group of concrete words has been compared to a heteroge-
neous group of words about which participants tended to
disagree.
Figure 5 plots the stimuli featured in Miller and Roodenrys
(2009). Again, there is a marked difference in standard devi-
ations between the concrete and the abstract stimuli.
Furthermore, the standard deviations of the abstract stimuli
are so high (well above 1 in the majority of cases) that the
mean value does not reflect the judgments that participants
were actually making.
Finally, consider Fig. 6, which depicts the stimuli featured
in Walker and Hulme (1999). The midscale criticism applies
least to this set of stimuli, although it is still clearly the case
that the concrete stimuli tended to have lower standard devi-
ations than the abstract stimuli. The reasons for this have al-
ready been expounded. The upshot is that a skeptic could
reasonably argue that these experiments do not actually pro-
vide evidence for concreteness effects. The reason is that the
comparison being made was meant to be between concrete
and abstract items, but the comparison that was actually made
was between concrete items, on the one hand, and a group of
stimuli about which participants disagree, on the other. It
could be the case that words that engender disagreement are
those that are hard to remember, and that this explains pro-
cessing differences that have previously been attributed to
concreteness/abstractness. The experiments that I report be-
low were designed to test this possibility.
Beforemoving on to a report of these replication attempts, I
wish to point out that list memory paradigms are not a special
case when it comes to the properties of Babstract^ stimuli.
Table 1 presents a number of experimental concreteness stud-
ies from a wide variety of paradigms, as well as a summary of
the concreteness values and standard deviations of the stimuli
featured in their experiments. The abstract–midscale stimulus
pattern applies to every single experiment.
Once again, I stress that none of the analysis presented here
is intended as a specific criticism of any of these studies.
These studies were chosen simply because they reflect a range
Fig. 4 Allen and Hulme (2006) stimuli
Fig. 5 Miller and Roodenrys (2009) stimuli
Fig. 6 Walker and Hulme (1999) stimuli
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of experimental paradigms (lexical decision, recall, semantic
judgment, word association, and picture–word matching), da-
ta types (behavioral, fMRI, electroencephalography [EEG]),
and include both neurotypical and patient populations. They
also, laudably, included their stimulus sets in their
experimental reports, although it is important to note that for
Sabsevitz et al. (2005) and Lee and Federmeier (2008) only
samples of the stimuli were available. For every study but one
listed in Table 1, the mean standard deviation of the stimuli in
the concrete condition was below 1, whereas the mean stan-
dard deviation of the stimuli in the abstract condition was
above 1. The only exception is Huang, Lee, and Federmeier
(2010), in which the standard deviations for both stimulus sets
were relatively high. Looking at the distributions displayed
above in Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, it is clear that the only way
these statistics could be obtained is if the midscale disagree-
ment problem applied to all of the abstract stimulus sets of the
experiments depicted in the table. I now turn to a report of
three new list memory replication experiments in which I
attempted to control for the problems that I have outlined so
far.
Experiment 1
The purpose of this experiment was to replicate an experiment
reported in Romani et al. (2008) while controlling for the
potentially problematic confound between the mean value of
a concreteness rating and the standard deviation of that rating.
Romani et al. presented participants with lists of words and
asked them to recall words from that list immediately after the
presentation of the last word of the list. Romani et al. reported
that participants were better at recalling lists of words that
consisted entirely of concrete words than at recalling lists that
consisted entirely of abstract words. Experiment 1 here inves-
tigated the reliability of this concreteness effect when the stan-
dard deviations of the concreteness value of the words across
lists was controlled, while also directly manipulating words’
standard deviation in order to ascertain whether the standard
deviation itself has a significant effect on task performance.
Figure 7 plots the mean concreteness values and standard
deviations of concreteness of the concrete and abstract stimuli
used in the present experiment in the sameway that the stimuli
used in previous experiments were plotted in the previous
section.
We can see that the contrast in concreteness between con-
ditions is maximized and that the difference in the standard
Fig. 7 Concrete and abstract stimuli featured in Experiment 1
Table 1 Concreteness statistics in various experimental paradigms








Kroll & Merves (1985) Behavioral Lexical decision 4.55 0.74 2.17 1.22
de Groot (1989) Behavioral Word association 4.66 0.6 2.36 1.24
Paivio et al. (1994) Behavioral Recall 4.83 0.47 2.29 1.28
Gee et al. (1999) Behavioral Recall 4.73 0.57 3 1.33
Binder, Nelson, & Krawczyk (2005) fMRI Lexical decision 4.76 0.52 2.34 1.23
Crutch & Warrington (2005) Patient population Word matching 4.83 0.46 3.53 1.18
Sabsevitz et al. (2005) fMRI Semantic judgment 4.86 0.45 2.58 1.31
ter Doest & Semin (2005) Behavioral Recall 4.72 0.57 2.45 1.26
Lee & Federmeier (2008) EEG Semantic judgment 4.41 0.88 2.27 1.24
Huang et al. (2010) EEG Semantic judgment 3.82 1.17 2.53 1.21
Skipper-Kallal, Mirman, & Olson (2015) fMRI Deep thought 4.44 0.81 2.38 1.22
Jager & Cleland (2016) Behavioral Lexical decision 4.62 0.64 3.29 1.19
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deviations of concreteness ratings is controlled. Of interest is
whether the concreteness effect would still occurs when these
new controls were enforced.
The specific Romani et al. (2008) experiment replicated
here is Experiment 3 B, which is a free-recall task in which
participants simply try to recall any word from the list that
they can, regardless of order. Romani et al. reported that con-
creteness effects are stronger in free-recall than in serial-recall
tasks, so a free-recall task provides the most robust test of the
concreteness effect. An additional two experimental condi-
tions were added: agreement and disagreement conditions.
Words in the agreement condition were taken from the middle
of the scale and had relatively low standard deviations, and
words in the disagreement condition were taken from the
middle of the scale and had relatively high standard devia-
tions. Summary psycholinguistic statistics for all conditions
are given in the Materials section below. Three comparisons
were of interest: concrete versus abstract, concrete versus dis-
agreement, and concrete versus agreement. In this way, the
importance of the midscale problem outlined in the section
above can be assessed.
Method
ParticipantsOriginally, 60 native speakers of English with no
reported neurological disorders were recruited from the
University College London SONApsychology pool. Of these,
50 completed the experiment (the other ten either did not turn
up or canceled their session). All participants were either
awarded course credit or paid £6 for their time.
Materials Forty lists, each containing eight words, were gen-
erated. There were four experimental conditions, each of
which comprised ten lists. The stimuli were controlled for
the following psycholinguistic variables: standard deviation
of concreteness, frequency, age of acquisition, number of pho-
nemes, number of letters, and number of syllables. Table 2
contains the mean values (with standard deviations in paren-
theses) of each of these variables for each condition.
Psycholinguistic variable information was gathered from
Brysbaert et al. (2013), Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez,
and Brysbaert (2012), and the English Lexicon Project
(Balota et al., 2007). The stimulus sets were created using
MATCH (van Casteren & Davis, 2007). The four conditions
were concrete, abstract, agreement, and disagreement.
Concrete lists contained words that had mean values
between 4 and 5 on the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness
scale. Abstract lists contained words that had mean values
between 1 and 2 on the Brysbaert (2013) concreteness scale.
The agreement and disagreement lists contained words that
had mean values between 2.5 and 3.5 on the Brysbaert et al.
(2013) concreteness scale. The concrete, abstract, and agree-
ment lists were constructed such that the standard deviations
of the concreteness ratings of the words in those lists were
similar, whereas the disagreement condition was formed ex-
clusively of stimuli with high standard deviations. Table 3
contains a sample list from each condition, and full lists of
the stimuli featured in all experiments reported in this study
are included in the Appendix.
Procedure The experimenter read all of the words from a list
one after the other. There was a 2-s pause between consecutive
words being read out. The order of the lists and the order of the
words within each list were randomized for each participant.
After the experimenter had finished reading out a list, the
participant spoke out loud any and all words that he or she
could remember from that list. The experimenter recorded
every word that the participant spoke. Because this was a
free-recall task, the order in which the participants recalled
the words did not matter. Participants were not penalized for
making errors or substitutions, or for saying a word that had
not actually been in the list. The experiment lasted approxi-
mately 35 min.
Results
Table 4 summarizes the mean numbers of words remembered
(and standard deviations) by condition.
Table 2 Stimulus properties
Condition Mean Concreteness SD Concreteness AoA Zipf Frequency L Phon Length N Syll
Concrete 4.38 (0.17) 1.02 (0.11) 10.45 (2.05) 3.34 (0.79) 5.59 (0.94) 6.93 (1.06) 2.00
Abstract 1.78 (0.14) 1.04 (0.12) 10.58 (2.09) 3.38 (0.83) 5.56 (0.93) 6.84 (1.17) 2.00
Agree 3.17 (0.7) 1.08 (0.07) 10.09 (1.9) 3.15 (0.85) 5.63 (1.03) 6.93 (1.21) 2.00
Disagree 3.1 (0.36) 1.65 (0.05) 10.23 (2.04) 3.13 (0.81) 5.76 (1.10) 6.9 (1.32) 2.00
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating; SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings; AoA: Age of acquisition; Zipf
frequency: Word frequency in Zipf units; L Phon: Length of word in phonemes; Length: Length of word in letters; N Syll: Number of syllables
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The results were analyzed with a mixed-effects model in R
using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker,
2015). The lmertest package was used in order to obtain p-
values for the comparisons of interest via Satterthwaite ap-
proximation (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015).
The mixed-effects model examined the fixed effect of exper-
imental condition on the number of words remembered per
trial, with subjects and items being treated as random effects
with varying intercepts.
The statistical contrasts were the abstract, disagreement,
and agreement conditions versus the concrete condition.
That is, a treatment contrast with the concrete condition
representing the baseline condition. Table 5 displays the re-
sults of this analysis.
Because three nonindependent hypothesis tests were run on
the same data, a Bonferroni correction was applied. Assuming
a conventional alpha level of .05, the corrected alpha level was
therefore .05/3 = .017. The concrete–abstract contrast was not
statistically significant (p = .13). Therefore, there was no evi-
dence for an advantage for concrete over abstract word lists,
contrary to the findings of Romani et al. (2008), Walker and
Hulme (1999), Allen and Hulme (2006), and Miller and
Roodenrys (2009). None of the other contrasts were statisti-
cally significant, either, at the Bonferroni-corrected alpha level
(concrete vs. agreement, p = .08; concrete vs. disagreement,
p = .02). There was therefore no evidence words from the
middle of the concreteness scale are simply harder to remem-
ber than words from the extreme concrete end of the scale, and
there was no evidence that words with high standard devia-
tions in rating are harder to remember than words from the
extreme concrete end of the scale. However, a reviewer raised
the important point that Experiment 1 suffered from a lack of
power, because there were only ten items per condition. This
could be the reason that no statistically significant results were
obtained.
To account for this possibility, the data were reanalyzed
using a Bayesian model comparison analysis in the
BayesFactor package for R (Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015)
with the default settings and priors. If the results of the
frequentist analysis presented in the preceding paragraphs
were due to low power, then the Bayes factors produced by
this analysis are likely to be between 1/3 and 3, which would
indicate that the data do not decide the issue either way.
Kruschke (2011, p. 310) argued that the Bayes factor gen-
erated from a model comparison analysis of an experimental
designwithmultiple conditions may bemisleading for various
reasons. Therefore, the total results dataset of Experiment 1
was partitioned into three smaller datasets that reflected the
pairwise comparisons of interest between the conditions: one
concrete–abstract comparison, one concrete–agree compari-
son, and one concrete–disagree comparison. In every case, a
model including a parameter for the fixed effect of condition
was compared to a null model that featured only subjects and
items as random effects. The resulting Bayes factors for each
comparison were concrete versus abstract, 0.32; concrete ver-
sus agree, 0.38; concrete versus disagree, 0.66. For the con-
crete–abstract comparison, there is marginal evidence in favor
of a null effect (BF = 0.32). For the other two comparisons, the
Bayes factor indicates that the data do not decide between the
null or alternative models. Taken together with the frequentist
analysis presented previously (all p values above the threshold
for statistical significance), these results suggest no difference
in recall between the concrete and abstract conditions.
However, the evidence for a null difference in the other com-
parisons is inconclusive.
Before moving on to the second replication experiment,
it is important to note a shortcoming of Experiment 1 that
may have affected the results. The standard deviations of
the concreteness ratings of both the concrete and abstract
stimuli were relatively high: above 1, in many cases. It
could be that, given the concerns raised in previous sec-
tions, neither condition provided an accurate sample from
the truly concrete or abstract sections of the scale. In the
second experiment that I will report, the standard devia-
tions of the conditions were more tightly constrained so
that in the concrete and abstract conditions, all standard
deviations were below 1.
Table 3 Sample stimulus lists
Condition Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5 Word 6 Word 7 Word 8
Concrete Beaker Clinic Tango Clothing Amber Jackal Roulette Survey
Abstract Desire Mystique Intent Vantage Glory Nuance Unease Motive
Agree Diesel Roughhouse Attempt Whiner Viewpoint Freshness Stampede Leader
Disagree Slipstream Audit Poorhouse Minute Rival Tribune Abyss Spectrum





Concrete 4.67 (1.35) 58.4%
Abstract 4.48 (1.24) 56%
Disagree 4.38 (1.28) 54.6%
Agree 4.45 (1.35) 55.6%
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Experiment 2
Paivio, Walsh, and Bons (1994) presented participants with
lists consisting of both concrete and abstract word pairs and
reported that concrete word pairs were recalled better than
abstract word pairs. This effect has been obtained in many
paired-associate learning experiments (Begg, 1972; Nelson
& Schreiber, 1992; Paivio, Khan, & Begg, 2000; Paivio
et al., 1994). Paivio et al. employed a range of different ma-
nipulations across two experiments. In this replication I fo-
cused on the simplest version of this paradigm, which is a
free-recall task, in order to make the results maximally com-
parable to those of Experiment 1 above. The aim of the present
experiment was to test whether a concreteness effect still oc-
curs if the contrast between concrete and abstract stimuli is
maximized and the standard deviations of their concreteness
scores are controlled. In addition to the concrete and abstract
conditions featured in the paired-associate learning studies
mentioned in this section, the present experiment also includ-
ed a midscale condition to provide a second test of the hypoth-
esis that high-standard-deviation midscale words are harder to
remember than words from the concrete end of the concrete-
ness scale.
Method
Participants Sixty native speakers of English with no report-
ed neurological disorders were recruited from the Prolific
Academic website. All participants were paid £6 for their
time.
Materials Figure 8 depicts the means and standard deviations
of the concreteness ratings for the concrete and abstract stim-
uli in Experiment 2. Table 6 displays the psycholinguistic
characteristics of the stimuli featured in the experiment, by
condition.
In Experiment 2 the additional control variable of mean
bigram frequency was introduced, because participants would
be reading and writing words as opposed to hearing and
speaking them. There were eight pairs of words in each
condition, and therefore each condition included 16 words,
for a total of 24 critical item pairs overall.
Procedure Participants undertook the experiment online via a
Qualtrics survey distributed over the Prolific Academic ser-
vice. Participants were presented with pairs of words, one after
the other. Following Marschark and Hunt (1989) and Paivio
et al. (1994), each pair of words was presented on the partic-
ipant’s computer screen for 8 s. Eight pairs were presented in
each of the three conditions, and all pairs were presented in a
randomized nonblocked order for each participant. The order-
ing of the words in each pair from left to right on the computer
screen was not randomized. At the beginning and end of the
list, three pairs of filler items were included in order to soak up
primacy and recency effects. Participants also received a short
practice trial with words not included in the main experiment,
to ensure that they understood the task and that their com-
puters and Internet connections were working properly.
Once the list of pairs was finished, participants could type
out any and all words that they remembered from the list.
Once they were finished, they pressed a BSubmit^ button that
ended the experiment. There were three experimental condi-
tions: A word pair could consist of concrete, abstract, or
midscale Bdisagreement^ items. The experiment lasted ap-
proximately 15 min.
Table 5 Summary of mixed-effects model for Experiment 1




Abstract –.19 –.12 39.25 –1.56 .13 –.43 .05
Agree –.22 –.12 39.25 –1.79 .08 –.46 .03
Disagree –.29 –.12 39.25 –2.42 .02 –.54 –.05
Fig. 8 Concrete and abstract stimuli featured in Experiment 2
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Results
Table 7 displays the mean numbers of words remembered
across conditions in Experiment 2.
The numbers of words recalled out of 16 were low, but the
variability across participants was large, as indicated by the
relatively high standard deviations of the mean numbers of
words recalled. This suggests floor effects for some partici-
pants. Second, the mean number of words in the abstract con-
dition was numerically larger than that in the concrete condi-
tion (3 < 3.43), so already we have failed to find evidence in
favor of a concrete stimulus advantage in paired-associate
learning. Finally, the difference between the means of the
concrete and disagree conditions was miniscule (3 vs. 3.05,
respectively).
The data were analyzed using a generalized linear mixed
model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace approximation)
using the glmer function from the lme4 package in R. The
dependent variable in this analysis was therefore the likeli-
hood of a participant recalling any word.1 Subjects and items
were included as random effects with varying intercepts, and
the fixed effect of condition was the effect of interest. Both
abstract and disagree conditions were compared to the con-
crete condition. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 8.
Experiment 2 generated no statistically significant effects:
p = .2 for the concrete–abstract contrast, and p = .88 for the
concrete–disagree contrast. This pattern of results is the same
as that found in Experiment 1: Under conditions that should
have made a concreteness effect stronger, such an effect was
not obtained. However, ultimately we should be cautious in
drawing any conclusions from the results of Experiment 2,
because floor effects may have obscured any differences be-
tween conditions.
Interim summary
Experiments 1 and 2 did not produce a concreteness effect.
This is worrying, given the concerns about the typically high
standard deviations of abstract stimuli outlined above. If we
increased a difference between conditions on some linear
measure, we would not expect experimental effects based on
this measure to disappear. However, Kousta, Vinson, and
Vigliocco (2009) showed that words with a high emotional
valence (whether positive or negative) enjoy a processing ad-
vantage over words with neutral emotional valance.2 Abstract
words tend to be rated higher for emotional valance than con-
crete words, and this variable was not controlled in
Experiment 1 or 2. Thus, it could be that a confound in the
stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2 obscured any concrete-
ness effect. Warriner et al.’s (2013) emotional valance norms
for ~14,000 English words would allow us to check this pos-
sibility. Emotional valance is rated on a scale of 1 (highly
negative) to 9 (highly positive), with a score of 5 indicating
an emotionally neutral word. Given that either emotional pos-
itivity or negativity results in a processing advantage, the ab-
solute value of 5 minus the emotional valance of a word pro-
vides a simple linear measure of emotional valance that ig-
nores polarity (0 = totally neutral, 4 = highly emotionally
valenced). Table 9 presents the mean absolute emotional va-
lences of the stimuli featured in Experiments 1 and 2.
The words in the concrete and midscale conditions were
indeed less emotionally valenced than those in the abstract
conditions in both experiments, so this might explain the null
results obtained from Experiments 1 and 2.
Another potential issue is that the words featured in
Experiments 1 and 2 were of relatively low frequency (be-
tween 3 and 4 on the Zipf scale), so it could be that participants
did not know all of the words.3 This could have obscured any
effect of manipulating concreteness. Brysbaert et al. (2013)
provided a measure of howmany of their participants reported
that they knew a word. Table 10 below displays the mean
percentages of participants who reported knowing a word
for each condition in Experiments 1 and 2.
1 A reviewer noted that analyzing the data in this way meant that this exper-
iment was arguably no longer a paired-associate learning task, presumably
because it did not account for the paired relationship between the words. In
their free-recall analyses, Paivio et al. (1994) calculated the proportions of
words remembered and conduct by-subjects and by-items ANOVAs on these
proportions. These analyses also ignored word pair relationships and produced
concreteness effects, so I think we would still expect the analysis presented
here to produce a concreteness effect.
2 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
3 Again, my thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
Table 6 Summary of stimulus characteristics for Experiment 2
Condition Mean Concreteness SD Concreteness AOA Zipf Frequency L Phon N Syll Length BG Mean
Concrete 4.51 (0.23) 0.91 (0.13) 9.92 (1.9) 3.54 (0.56) 4.75 (0.2) 1.75 (0.43) 6.125 (1.41) 3,573 (1,151)
Abstract 1.61 (0.17) 0.81 (0.11) 10.04 (1.64) 3.48 (0.69) 5.25 (1.44) 1.75 (0.43) 6.44 (1.5) 3,457 (1,176)
Disagreement 3 (0.23) 1.33 (0.02) 9.78 (1.95) 3.72 (0.78) 5.75 (1.48) 1.81 (0.39) 6.38 (1.45) 3,218 (957)
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating; SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings; AoA: Age of acquisition; Zipf
frequency: Word frequency in Zipf units; L Phon: Length of word in phonemes; N Syll: Number of syllables; Length: Length of word in letters; BG
mean: Mean bigram frequency
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These percentages are high, so it is likely that the number of
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 who did not know a word
was very low. However, it would obviously be preferable if
only words with known percentages of 100% were used.
Unfortunately, for reasons detailed in the General Discussion
below, enforcing this control raised new problems. I now re-
port an additional list memory experiment that controlled for
emotional valence, in order to provide a better test of the
robustness of the concreteness effect.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was a free-recall list memory experiment in the
vein of Experiment 1. There were three changes to the para-
digm. First, six-word lists were used instead of eight-word
lists. This change was made so that more trials per condition
(15 in Exp. 3 vs. 10 in Exp. 1) could be fitted into roughly the
same amount of time. Romani et al. (2008) and Miller and
Roodenrys (2009) both reported concreteness effects with six-
word lists. Second, the words were presented visually, and
participants wrote out the words at the end of a list instead
of speaking them out loud. This change was made because to
maximize efficiency, the experiment was run over the Internet
using the Gorilla.sc platform. Finally, only three conditions
were included: concrete, abstract, and midscale words with
high standard deviations.
Method
ParticipantsA total of 70 participants were recruited from the
Prolific Academic website. Of these, 62 completed the exper-
iment. The other eight did not respond to every trial, and so
were excluded. The experiment was delivered via Gorilla.sc
and lasted approximately 35 min. Participants were paid £5
for their time.
Materials The stimuli were controlled for the following psy-
cholinguistic variables: standard deviation of the concreteness
rating, frequency, age of acquisition, number of syllables,
number of letters, mean bigram frequency, and emotional va-
lence. Table 11 contains the mean values (with standard devi-
ations in parentheses) of each of these variables for each con-
dition, as well as the mean percentages of people in the
Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms who reported knowing the
words in each condition.
There were three experimental conditions: concrete, abstract,
and midscale. There were 15 six-word lists in each condition.
Procedure Participants were presented with words in se-
quence one at a time in the center of their computer screens.
As in Romani et al.’s (2008) visual paradigms, each word
remained on the screen for 3 s. After each list had been pre-
sented, participants typed out any and all words that they
could remember. They were told that the order of the words
did not matter and not to worry about spelling. Participants
received two practice trials in order to ensure that they under-
stood how to complete the experiment. The orders of the lists
and of the words within each list were randomized for each
participant.
Results
Table 12 summarizes the mean numbers of words remem-
bered (and standard deviations) by condition.
The results from Experiment 3 were analyzed in the same
way as the results from Experiment 1. Both frequentist and
Bayesian analyses are presented. Table 13 displays the results





Concrete 3 (2.73) 18.6%
Abstract 3.43 (3.07) 21.5%
Disagree 3.05 (2.84) 19.1%
Table 8 Summary of a generalized linear mixed model analysis of
Experiment 2
Effect Effect Estimate Std. Error z p
Abstract .19 .15 1.3 .2
Disagree .02 .15 .15 .88
Table 10 Mean percentages of participants who reported in Brysbaert
et al. (2013) knowing the words featured in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment Concrete Abstract Disagree Agree
1 98.5% 98.3% 97.7% 98.5%
2 99.5% 99.1% 98% N/A
Table 9 Emotional valences of stimuli featured in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment Concrete Abstract Disagree Agree
1 0.82 1.17 0.88 1.15
2 0.91 1.61 0.99 N/A
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of a mixed-effects linear model with a fixed effect of condition
and random intercepts for subjects and items.
After controlling for the effects of emotional valence, these
results are muchmore encouraging for the status of concreteness
as a useful psycholinguistic variable. The concrete–abstract com-
parison is statistically significant at p = .003, and the difference is
in the direction we would expect. The contrast between the con-
crete and midscale conditions was not statistically significant
(p = .08). Because this experiment still featured a relatively small
number of items, a Bayesian model comparison analysis was
deployed in an attempt to offset a potential lack of power.
Again, the default settings and priors of the BayesFactor package
were used. As in Experiment 1, the results from Experiment 3
were split into subsets so that the abstract and midscale condi-
tions would be compared to the concrete condition individually.
The resulting Bayes factors for each comparison were concrete
versus abstract, 5.85; concrete versus midscale, 0.47. For the
concrete–abstract comparison, the Bayesian analysis is compa-
rable to the frequentist analysis: A model containing an effect of
condition is 5.85 times more likely given the data than a model
without this effect, which is quite strong evidence in favor of a
concreteness effect. However, the concrete–midscale analysis
was inconclusive. One thing to note is that Experiment 3 featured
words with similar rates of knowledge to those in Experiments 1
and 2. Experiment 3 produced a concreteness effect, so this
might partially allay concerns that Experiments 1 and 2 produced
null results because participants did not know the words used. I
now turn to a general discussion of these results in light of the
issues discussed in the introductory section on concreteness
norms, as well as a consideration of other psycholinguistic var-
iables (imageability, modality exclusivity norms, and emotional
valence).
General discussion
The first two experiments did not produce a concreteness ef-
fect, but these experiments featured a confound: The abstract
stimuli had higher emotion ratings than the concrete stimuli.
Experiment 3 controlled for emotional valence, and the typical
concreteness effect reemerged. This highlights the importance
of controlling for emotional valence in list memory para-
digms. There were no statistically significant differences be-
tween the concrete conditions and the midscale conditions in
any experiment. This demonstrates that researchers who are
interested in the concreteness effect should maximize the con-
trast between concrete and abstract stimuli and keep the stan-
dard deviations of their stimuli low (below 1) in order to
maximize their chances of detecting an effect.
It might seem curious that, given that other list memory
studies have revealed concreteness effects when comparing
mostly concrete stimuli with mostly high-standard-deviation
midscale stimuli, no such effect was obtained in any of the
experiments reported here. As I argued when discussing the
Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms, the middle of the concreteness
scale is marked by a high degree of variability that is difficult
to interpret. One of the aims of this article was to test the
possibility that words that people agree about how to rate are
easier to remember than words that people disagree about how
to rate. The three experiments reported here do not provide
evidence either way on this point: p values above .05
(corrected) and Bayes factors between 1/3 and 3 for the con-
crete–midscale comparisons indicate evidence for neither the
null nor the alternative hypothesis. The most likely reason for
this is a lack of power: The experiments presented here did not
feature many stimuli per condition. However, as I will discuss
below, this problem is harder to address than might first ap-
pear. Furthermore, the abstract conditions in the experiments
of Romani et al. (2008), Walker and Hulme (1999), Miller and
Roodenrys (2009), and Allen and Hulme (2006) were not
entirelymade up of midscale stimuli. So if there is a concrete-
ness effect in list memory experiments, the abstract–concrete
comparisons in these previous experiments would be more
likely to detect it than were the concrete–midscale compari-
sons reported here.











Concrete 4.55 (0.17) 0.81 (0.12) 10.11 (1.28) 3.41 (0.48) 2.42 (0.86) 7.63 (1.79) 3,649 (1,134) 1.12 (0.77) 99%
Abstract 1.61 (0.15) 0.85 (0.11) 10.2 (1.95) 3.54 (0.72) 2.53 (0.89) 7.63 (1.95) 3,710 (1,208) 1.15 (0.78) 99%
Midscale 3.02 (0.26) 1.51 (0.77) 10.11 (1.99) 3.53 (0.72) 2.54 (0.86) 7.57 (1.89) 3,737 (1,184) 1.15 (0.77) 98.7%
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating; SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings; AoA: Age of acquisition; Zipf
frequency: Word frequency in Zipf units; N Syll: Number of syllables; Length: Length of word in letters; BG mean : Mean bigram frequency; Absolute
Valence: Absolute value of 5 minus the Warriner et al. (2013) emotional valence score.





Concrete 4.06 (1.31) 67.7%
Abstract 3.7 (1.25) 61.7%
Midscale 3.85 (1.28) 64.2%
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This issue aside, in light of my arguments regarding
Brysbaert et al. (2013), we should probably avoid using
midscale words on purely theoretical grounds: It is unclear
what an individual concreteness rating is even measuring
when it has a high standard deviation. A reviewer raised the
point that abstract words tend to have more variable meanings
than concrete words, so more variability in their ratings might
be expected. This may be true, but I think it somewhat misses
the point. If there is any point in using the concreteness mea-
sure (or the other measures I discuss below), we have to take
our participants’ ratings seriously. If a word in the middle of
the scale has a standard deviation above 1, that means a sig-
nificant number of participants judged it to be concrete. Thus,
there isn’t a basis for putting that word in the Babstract^ cate-
gory: It does not make sense to pay attention to only half of the
participants’ judgments. There is another potential issue, even
if we make sure to restrict our Babstract^ stimuli to mean
ratings of 2 or below. Typically, concreteness research has
focused on nouns rather than adjectives or verbs. Even starting
with a set of 40,000 words, the number of nouns in the
Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms that (1) have a mean rating of
2 or below (i.e., are highly abstract), (2) have a standard de-
viation of 1 or below, and (3) were known by 100% of the
norming population is only 275. Of these, a small but nontriv-
ial number are either idiomatic fragments (Bamuck^) or mor-
phologically complex rarities (Bpurposefulness^) that we
might be reluctant to include in stimulus lists. In contrast,
2,888 well-known nouns have mean ratings of 4 or above
and standard deviations below 1.
I think this fact should alsomotivate caution concerning the
utility of the concreteness measure. Ultimately, the measure is
supposed to tap into a fundamental, neuropsychologically real
distinction between different kinds of concepts. It is worrying
that the rating is only interpretable for a small number of
nominal Bconcepts^ at the abstract pole. However, it is still
the case that Experiment 3 produced a concreteness effect. At
the very least, we can say that there is some evidence that
samples of these Btruly^ abstract words tend to be harder to
remember than highly concrete words.
I turn now to a discussion of other semantic psycholinguis-
tic variables. The midscale variability problem applies to other
variables that measure sensorimotor experience. This is not
surprising, because these variables are derived in much the
same way as concreteness (by taking the mean value of a set
of individual judgments about the depth of sensorimotor
experience). This is especially significant because it shows
that nothing about the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness
norms is deficient. Instead, the problems I have identified here
are general to a whole class of psycholinguistic measures.
Figure 9 presents a mean–standard deviation plot of the
imageability ratings of 6,000 words, amalgamated from two
databases (Cortese & Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012).
Imageability is a measure of how easy it is to generate a men-
tal image of the referent of a word, and this variable is so
highly correlated with concreteness that the two have often
been used interchangeably in the literature.
The distribution is identical to that of the concreteness mea-
sure. A similar pattern emerges for Lynott and Connell’s
(2012) modality exclusivity norm (MEN). MEN essentially
measures the same thing as concreteness, but it provides more
information because it features ratings for all five primary
sensory modalities (sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell). A
low rating indicates that the referent of a word offers little
experience in a given modality; a high rating indicates that a
referent offers a lot of experience. Each word is rated on all
five modalities. This results in a five-element vector from
which various measures can be derived (mean sensory expe-
rience, maximum sensory experience, Euclidean distance
from origin, etc.). Figure 10 displays mean–standard deviation
plots of all 400 words in the MEN for the five sensory
modalities.
What is striking here is that even with just 400 words, the
familiar shape of the distribution is clearly apparent. I do not
Table 13 Summary of frequentist mixed-effects model for Experiment 3




Abstract –.37 .12 44.34 –3.11 .003 –.61 –.13
Midscale –.21 .12 44.34 –1.79 .08 –.45 .03



















Fig. 9 Means and standard deviations of imageability ratings for 6,000
words (Cortese & Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012)
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think that we can ignore the fact that all of these datasets have
the same problematic distribution. This is likely to be a result
of the question that we ask participants when we generate
these measures. When we present depth of sensorimotor ex-
perience as a scale, we are implicitly committing to the idea
that is possible for an entity to be Bhalf-real,^ or Bhalf in
space–time,^ or Bhalf-seeable.^ The distributions of these se-
mantic variables tell us that participants tend to reject this idea:
They do not use midscale values.
One solution might be to specify explicitly what we want
the middle of these scales to represent, and to provide exam-
ples of midscale words for participants so that they have some-
thing to anchor their judgments to. Whether something along
these lines would usefully decrease variability in the middle of
the scale is an open question, but a potential issue here is that it
is very difficult (for me) to think of a construct that could serve
as a midscale anchor between Bconcreteness^ and
Babstractness.^More worryingly, given that there are relative-
ly few words in the abstract half of the scale with low standard
deviations, it could be that the concrete–abstract dichotomy is
just not well formed.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss the distribution of emo-
tional valence ratings. Emotional valence is different from the
sensorimotor variables discussed above, in that it measures a
completely separate dimension of experience. The standard
deviation of an emotional valence rating also takes on a spe-
cial importance because of how the scale is constructed.
Figure 11 presents the means and standard deviations of the
emotional valence scores from Warriner et al. (2013) (n =
13,900). Warriner et al. presented this plot and touched on this
issue, but they did not raise exactly the same point as the one I
want to focus on here.
Recall that a score of 1 indicates extremely negative emo-
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Fig. 10 Means and standard deviations of Lynott and Connell’s (2012) modality exclusivity norms
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positive emotional valence. Looking at Fig. 11, it should be
possible to select unequivocally negative, neutral, and positive
words for use in experiments: There are some words at mean
ratings of 1, 5, and 9 with low standard deviations. This is
obviously a good thing.
However, because the middle of this scale is a neutral point
between two extremes, words with high standard deviations
are especially problematic. This is because a 5 is supposed to
indicate emotional neutrality. But if a word has a mean of 4–6
but a standard deviation of 2 or more, that means that on
average, participants actually associate moderate to large emo-
tional responses with that word. Some participants associate
positive emotions with the word, but others associate negative
emotions with it. Quite a few words look neutral, but in fact
are not. A few examples are:
Cell: Mean = 4.09, SD = 2.69
Sushi: Mean = 6.25, SD = 2.77
Gym: Mean = 5.84, SD = 2.52
Similarly, if a word has a mean emotional valence of, say,
3, but a standard deviation above 1.5, that means that some
people report a very strong negative response to that word,
whereas some people report little or no emotional response at
all. So if a researcher is interested in comparing responses to
neutral words with responses to emotionally valenced words,
they should definitely avoid words with high standard devia-
tions for emotional valence, because they will add a signifi-
cant amount of noise to the experimental design. One positive
thing to note is that for the emotional valence measure, a high
standard deviation is potentially problematic but is still
interpretable. It makes sense that different people will associ-
ate different emotions with certain words. It also makes sense
to think of our emotional responses as graded. I think this is a
key difference between the sensorimotor experience variables
and the emotional valence measure.
Conclusion
I have argued that there is a problem with the statistical
characteristics of various semantic psycholinguistic vari-
ables (focusing in particular on the concreteness variable).
In a great number of cases, mean values do not reflect the
judgments that actual participants made about a word.
Furthermore, mean values in the middle of these scales
are difficult to interpret because it is not clear what prop-
erty they indicate. Unfortunately, it appears that in many
experiments reported throughout the literature on concrete-
ness effects, many of the stimuli in the abstract conditions
are not actually abstract. Instead, they are precisely those
stimuli for which the mean concreteness value is a bad
indicator of what participants’ choices were. In two of the
new list memory experiments reported here, no concrete-
ness effect was obtained when the contrast in concreteness
between conditions was maximized. However, when emo-
tional valence was controlled, a concreteness effect was
obtained in Experiment 3.
The concreteness effect obtained in Experiment 3 is en-
couraging, because it allays some of the concerns outlined
above. However, there are still a number of reasons to be
cautious about concreteness and other related semantic vari-
ables. First, the status of words with high standard deviations
is entirely unclear. These high standard deviations for
midscale words might arise at least partially because it is
unintuitive to treat sensorimotor experience as a graded prop-
erty. Second, only a very small number of Babstract^ nouns
have low standard deviations. This calls into question the util-
ity of the concreteness–abstractness dichotomy as it is current-
ly operationalized. Also, researchers who want to use nominal
stimuli or control for word class have very little choice if they
want to keep the standard deviations of their stimuli low. For
the emotional valence measure, I think the picture is some-
what better. High standard deviations provide meaningful in-
formation, although it is perhaps even more important to keep
standard deviations low when making comparisons between
different areas of the scale.
The good news is that the use of new large-scale psycho-
linguistic databases such as the Brysbaert et al. (2013) con-
creteness norms and Warriner et al.’s (2013) emotional va-
lence norms rather than relatively small, older databases
(Coltheart, 1981) can allow researchers to sidestep the prob-
lems I raise completely. This is because the sheer size of these
datasets allows for the selection of suitable stimuli.
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Table 14 1. Experiment 1 stimuli
List condition Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5 Word 6 Word 7 Word 8
1 disagree polling dipstick decade centaur exhaust foreword limbo spender
2 disagree physic sequel deacon nettle output earshot deadline cackle
3 disagree brethren zenith deluge silence lawsuit theorist polka margin
4 disagree nappy degree panic bearings legend request physics prefect
5 disagree sponsor delta dropper phantom egghead rightness aerial eyesight
6 disagree halter brainwave mankind nightlife surname scrounger tunic omen
7 disagree pariah divorce cosmos sundries purveyor demon crosswind alias
8 disagree grammar conveyance easement blackball woodland giantess weeknight instant
9 disagree tidbit shallows photon plural hallmark grafting sandman nature
10 disagree slipstream audit poorhouse minute rival tribune abyss spectrum
11 agree menace bookie tinting flicker rebound squatter tempo pusher
12 agree uprise digest tiling region charmer joyride outbreak nutrient
13 agree hubbub matron median nuthouse pullout partner distaste refill
14 agree burial backwash mover career event footing caper peacetime
15 agree jailbreak torment hazard instinct guru downpour richness glucose
16 agree bunting rhythm stalker dullness ascent headache gunpoint welfare
17 agree ringside archduke turmoil shyness posse gangway shipping outreach
18 agree sunburst mishap bumpkin deceit villain bloodlust misdeed hunting
19 agree diesel roughhouse attempt whiner viewpoint freshness stampede leader
20 agree semblance havoc broadside dining image dissent goner culprit
21 abstract setback vagueness spirit notion loyalty esteem phrasing credence
22 abstract charade rapture betrayal logic backlash renown letdown affront
23 abstract desire mystique intent vantage glory nuance unease motive
24 abstract amends prestige godsend satire leeway wordplay pretense calmness
25 abstract accord whimsy disdain hardship virtue manner regard effect
26 abstract freelance mischief respite folly pureness repute courage meantime
27 abstract merit standpoint future allure rapport wisdom prudence insight
28 abstract mistake quantum dogma function purpose willpower hearsay meaning
29 abstract patience aspect debut fairness pity taboo riddance appeal
30 abstract piety finesse foresight longshot loathing stigma concern control
31 concrete leaflet roadhouse artist lighting parsley seabed ironwork lacrosse
32 concrete clipper pewter cauldron quarry blockade earwig clubfoot logbook
33 concrete summit breeches abscess foreman award entree funnel beacon
34 concrete corset template pigment fuchsia urchin ringworm crewman mansion
35 concrete jester gasket sternum backdrop bouncer chapel resort county
36 concrete penthouse fracture entrails vinyl buckskin tundra barrier plumbing
37 concrete timepiece methane record tiller grindstone merchant shrapnel duchess
38 concrete quarter bulkhead sarong tenant chamber canon bailiff machine
39 concrete beaker clinic tango clothing amber jackal roulette survey
40 concrete spiral marrow billiard bootlace scabies saffron captain product
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Table 16 3. Experiment 3 stimuli
List Number Condition Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5 Word 6
1 concrete pad harpoon stretcher kennel ulcer aftershave
2 concrete trachea parsley fuselage rifleman plaster medallion
3 concrete cedar rubble trinket composer liver dormitory
4 concrete scale shipment gladiator guesthouse morgue marrow
5 concrete vineyard porcelain cocktail warship advisor slate
6 concrete supervisor infirmary bouquet manicure bay tomb
7 concrete graphics sage smoothie wildfire prosecutor sapphire
8 concrete inspector minefield tourist stub horseradish frostbite
9 concrete guitarist notch gauntlet orphanage vegetation bomber
10 concrete greenhouse sedative museum silicon wreckage accountant
11 concrete incubator lavender surgeon violinist courtroom embroidery
12 concrete landlord measles dictator pacemaker minibus plumber
13 concrete newsletter bodyguard stockbroker foliage petroleum liqueur
14 concrete plantation attorney blockade antibiotic concert currency
15 concrete stroke titanium bile sniper massage adhesive
16 abstract urge renown patience motive malice quandary
17 abstract penance belief indulgence reproach version fixation
18 abstract mercy glory charade aptitude manner formality
19 abstract risk psyche rhetoric foresight fraud regard
20 abstract prudence oblivion hardship mood sarcasm fate
21 abstract extent imposition purpose competence luck whim
22 abstract willpower bias indecision loyalty seriousness knowledge
23 abstract involvement existence coincidence ruse principles betrayal
24 abstract detriment subtlety tradition damnation wisdom fantasy
25 abstract forgiveness semantics value sanctity godsend discretion
26 abstract eternity politeness concept reasoning anomaly symbolism
27 abstract suspicion goodness arrogance mortality chance theory
28 abstract precedent privacy likelihood lunacy oversight revenge
29 abstract affirmative repentance leniency similarity merit expertise
30 abstract wickedness analogy bliss coercion courage avoidance
31 midscale plot molecule mankind format swindle motherland
32 midscale hormone reply tarot tribune routine pushover
33 midscale delay gossip slumber bandwagon response vigilante
Table 15 2. Experiment 2 stimuli
Pair Condition Word 1 Word 2
1 concrete cauldron hike
2 concrete footman band
3 concrete blazer creature
4 concrete rubble liqueur
5 concrete throttle ulcer
6 concrete ranch gauntlet
7 concrete cadet concert
8 concrete ledge manor
9 abstract betrayal urge
10 abstract revenge foresight
11 abstract godsend risk
12 abstract wisdom psyche
13 abstract hardship malice
14 abstract greed riddance
15 abstract loyalty lenience
16 abstract bliss mercy
17 midscale genius royalty
18 midscale foreground district
19 midscale gleam patriot
20 midscale view approach
21 midscale upstart brawn
22 midscale expanse profit
23 midscale asset vortex
24 midscale habit encore
Behav Res
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